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Global financial supervision is evolveing with financial crisis. Basel accords
revised many times, take 3 steps, including Basel , Basel II and Basel III, which
becomes the best theory and practice standards in global banking. Small-medium
sized commercial bank is the most impotant financial intermedium in motivating
microeconomy and promoting economy efficiency. Risk preference is the bank’s
risk attitudes, which combines risk with return. Risk tolerance is the solvency
probability of bank, which is maximium bank risk-taking. It is very important in
theory and reality for promoting business and core competition to specify risk
preference exactly, measure risk tolerance scientifically.
Basel new accords supply a safety margin to banking business. However, these
accords always more focus on international activity banks than Small-medium
sized commercial bank. With comparativation different standards of Small-
medium sized commercial bank in America, Europe, Japan and China, this
dissertation denotes total assets lower than 2000 billion is Small-medium sized
commercial bank. We should recognize Basel new accords bring additive cost as
a result of great impact on Small-medium sized commercial bank.
Literatures suggest that strict capital regulation affecting bank risk-taking does not
get conforming conclusion. Supervision institutes increase capital adequacy ratio,
which may influence bank risk preference and deduce its risk-taking. However, it
finds that capital regulations are effective in mitigating risk-taking in a low
concentrated market, but ambiguous in a high concentrated market when
introduces the model of market structure. From the analysis of bank risk-taking
under the New Basel accords model, it finds that reducing bank risk-taking will be
restrained because the big and small banks have choosing IRB rights. RAROC is
an important instrument for bank choosing risk tolerance, and economical capital













otherwise K is relative to risk tolerance. Applying CAPM model is a better choice
with measuring risk preference with tolerance in products, region and business
lines.
Chinese bank is regulated by government comparative to American Small-
medium sized commercial bank in advantage of economical condition with
institution, laws, credit and market operating. Corporate governance is the main
risk for Small-medium sized commercial bank. Laws protecting interest ones (e.g.
investors and depositors) need completing for Chinese commercial bank. Small-
medium sized commercial bank should build risk preference framework from risk
government structure, organization and indicators. We advise Small-medium
sized commercial bank specify risk preference which is conformed transmitting
mechanism and modification.
Evidence shows that Chinese bank is in medium-oligopoly market, market
concentration decreasing by year and capital regulation influence Small-medium
sized commercial bank greatly. Small-medium sized commercial bank’s
systematic risk is greater than big ones significantly because of government
implicit guarantee. Cost loss degree of national big banks is higher than regional
ones, but technology efficiency is larger than Small-medium sized ones. National
Small-medium sized commercial bank is larger than regional ones. Risk adverse
bank always get better performance in China. It finds that cost inefficiency is
volatile, and estimated average inefficiency higher than Small-medium sized
commercial bank in sample of Xib. Risk adverse of Xib contributes considerable
return.
Restrained by tighten monetary and strict supervision, Chinese bank expand
slowly, and capital adequacy or non-preferment loan is healthy. Changes to
market and supervision environment will stimulate Chinese bank strategy
reforming. Xib enlarge market share is urgent. Risk management will be













management organization, promote business combined, specify risk preference,
minitor total risk tolerance, opium resource allocation in domestic and foreign
market, and improve total factor productivity by strides.
This dissertation is divided into four sections, including six chapters. The first
section is about introduction. It advocates the topic, significance of theory and
reality, structure, methodology, innovations and further research in introduction.
The second section is about theoretical analysis, including chapter 1, 2 and 3.
Chapter 2 presents Basel accords development, conception of capital, risk
preference and tolerance. Chapter 3 builds commercial bank capital, risk
preference and tolerance analytical framework by model, which is the basis of
theoretical and empirical analysis afterwards. Chapter 4 mainly analyzes the
factors effecting risk preference, transmitting mechanism in order to Small-
medium sized commercial bank’s characters. 
The third section is about empirical results. Chapter 5 shows the evidence of risk
tolerance, including market share, capital regulation and bank risk taking,
systematic risk of listing bank, relationship between cost efficiency and risk,  risk
adverse of  Small-medium sized commercial bank, and risk tolerance of Xib.
The forth section is about conclusion, including chapter 6 and endings. Chapter 6
emphasizes applying theoretical and empirical results to practice, with the
purpose of analyzing supervision environment, exploring strategy target, specify
risk preference, clarity risk-taking to realize maximum bank value. The endings
summarize the conclusions and further research.
This dissertation combines theory and practice qualitative analysis and
quantitative analysis, normative analysis and empirical analysis in research
measures, which is systematization and maneuverability with academical value.
The innovations of this dissertation are as follows:
Firstly, subject investigated. Chinese research focus on big-medium bank, other













bank in aspects by panel data. This dissertation expands Small-medium sized
commercial bank, in the base of bank system to analyze bank capital, risk
preference and tolerance, which is good for prudential supervision.
Secondly, research contents. This dissertation tries to analyze Small-medium
sized commercial bank risk preference character, framework, and measure risk
tolerance, develop indicators in the light of Small-medium sized commercial
bank’s risk tolerance management. Meanwhile, provide evidence from market
share, capital regulation and bank risk-taking, systematical risk, cost efficiency,
and risk adverse supply evidence for Small-medium sized commercial bank’s risk
tolerance. Then advocate suggestions in term of environments, strategy target
and risk preference of Xib.
Thirdly, methodology used. This dissertation introduces the recent studies, pursuit
international financial supervision dynastic, do tests by bank risk measurement
with data mining. It refines mainly indicators and develops models at the basis of
theoretical model and evidential surportion.
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